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FREE SPEECH AND AUTONOMY:
THINKERS, STORYTELLERS, AND A
SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO SPEECH
Susan H. Williams*
Ed’s and Seana’s papers together present a powerful
argument for the idea that autonomy is a fundamental value
underlying the protection of free speech. As I have written
1
elsewhere, I agree with this argument. In this response to their
papers, I would like to suggest that an autonomy approach
focused on narrative rather than choice as the vehicle for
autonomy offers some advantages. First, I will outline briefly the
functions served by autonomy that provide a foundation for this
value in our moral and political experience. Second, I will offer a
narrative model of autonomy and describe how it serves the
functions in our moral and political lives for which we need
autonomy. Third, I will highlight the two primary advantages of
this model: (1) seeing autonomy as an ongoing process rather
than an assumed starting point, and (2) focusing our attention on
systems of free speech—rather than only on individuals, whether
they are speakers, listeners, or thinkers. I believe that this focus
on systemic concerns is crucial to rethinking the commitment to
free speech in a way that makes issues of inequality central and
therefore holds the promise of making free speech a living and
meaningful part of people’s experience.

* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Director, Center for Constitutional
Democracy at Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to all of the
participants in the free speech theory group for the engaging conversation and to Jim
Weinstein for organizing the group and keeping us moving along. And I would like to
take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to Ed Baker for his kind
encouragement to me over the years and for the brilliance, integrity, and sincerity of his
scholarship, which have inspired all of us.
1. See generally SUSAN H. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2004) (offering an approach to the
first amendment based on a reconceptualization of truth and autonomy as the
fundamental values and democracy as a particularly important application of both
values).
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I. THE FUNCTIONS OF AUTONOMY AND A2
NARRATIVE MODEL THAT SERVES THEM
An autonomy theory needs grounding: it needs to explain
the source of the particular version of autonomy that it is using,
and that source needs to provide a basis for believing that this
autonomy value is fundamental in a way that explains its
constitutional status. For Ed, the source is a particular
understanding of the respect that a government must show its
citizens in order to legitimately demand their obedience to its
3
laws. For Seana, the source is the collection of capacities—
rational, emotional, perceptual, and sentient—that “correctly
constitute the core of what we value about ourselves” and that
together constitute “the individual mind and the autonomy of its
4
operation.” I take a more functionalist and relational approach
that focuses on social practices. In order to know what autonomy
means and why it matters, I begin by asking what is the work
that we want and need the concept of autonomy to do in our
moral and political lives? If those functions are of fundamental
importance to us—as I believe they are—then we have both an
explanation of the importance of autonomy and a framework for
assessing a particular concept of autonomy to see if it can fulfill
these functions.
I believe that there are at least four primary functions
served by the concept of autonomy in our moral and political
lives. These functions are fundamental in the sense that, if we
did not have a concept of autonomy that could effectively do
these things, we would both find our moral lives deeply
disrupted and lose moral and political practices of great value to
us. All of these functions are described in terms of social
practices and the value of those practices runs both to the
individuals involved in them in any given instance and to all
5
members of the societies that can sustain them.
The first function of autonomy is to ground a collection of
attitudes towards ourselves, including self-trust and self-respect.
Self-trust is the ability and inclination to rely upon oneself, even
2. The first two sections of this paper are a short summary of the argument I
develop in greater detail in TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH. See id. at 130–72.
3. See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251,
251 (2011) [hereinafter Baker, Autonomy].
4. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 285, 287 (2011).
5. Or, as Tim describes them in his comment, “bystanders.” See Tim Scanlon,
Comment on Shiffrin’s Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 327, 331 (2011).
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if it leads to vulnerability. Self-respect is the belief that one is
worthwhile as a person and the disposition to act on that belief
by, for example, resisting violations of one’s rights, being
committed to one’s own projects and values, and maintaining
6
one’s personal standards. Both of these attitudes allow us to
experience ourselves as agents and not merely as objects of our
own observation. Without self-trust and self-respect, we would
be incapable of forming and working to implement plans. I
assume that the value of this orientation toward ourselves is
7
obvious enough to need little argument.
These valuable attitudes toward ourselves are dependent
upon a concept of autonomy. If one experienced oneself as the
unwilling and helpless pawn of forces beyond one’s control, with
no capacity for self-direction, then it would be impossible to
8
trust oneself. Similarly, the projects of self-respect—resisting
violations of rights, developing and being committed to one’s
9
own values, and maintaining personal standards —are possible
only if we see ourselves as agents capable of some meaningful
self-direction. So, whatever our view of the world and the issues
of causal determinism when we adopt the perspective of an
10
“observer,” we must also have available to us the perspective of
11
the autonomous, that is, self-directing, agent. Allowing us
access to that perspective is one of the important functions of a
concept of autonomy that any acceptable version must fulfill.
The perspective of the autonomous agent is also crucial to
our understanding of character and the possibility of integrity.
Character is a collection of personality traits, attitudes, and
values held by an individual that is relatively stable over time.
Character ties a life together, allowing us to see ourselves and
others as more than simply arbitrary collections of behaviors and
experiences. Owen Flanagan describes soldiers suffering from an
identity crisis who were observed by Erik Erikson as follows:
[T]hey normally experience themselves as the locus of a set of
subjectively linked events, as a sort of conduit . . . What they
lack . . . is any sense of coherent and authoritative “me-ness,”
6. See DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 210–13 (1989).
7. See Robin S. Dillon, How to Lose Your Self-Respect, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 125, 134–
35 (1992).
8. See KEITH LEHRER, SELF-TRUST 96 (1997).
9. See Dillon, supra note 7, at 134.
10. See Susan Wendell, Oppression and Victimization: Choice and Responsibility in
“NAGGING” QUESTIONS: FEMINIST ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 57–66 (Dana E.
Bushnell ed., 1995).
11. See Richard Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 893 (1994).
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of personal sameness—any sense that these subjectively
linked events occurring to and in them constitute a person, a
12
self, a life.

For these soldiers, there is not a complete breakdown of the
boundaries of personal identity: they are aware when an act or
emotion happens to them rather than to someone else. The
problem is that they cannot see why the simple fact of the
location of that act or emotion in them makes it theirs in any
meaningful sense. They have lost a sense of authorship or
autonomy. This sense of autonomous agency is the glue that
holds together the disparate elements of a life into a single
person with a coherent character.
Autonomy is also central to our understandings of moral
responsibility. In the voluminous literature on responsibility,
there is a general consensus that responsibility rests on
13
autonomy. Indeed, rather than arguing for the connection, it is
usually assumed and marshaled in support of one or another
conception of autonomy (as providing better support for the
practices of responsibility). If we think of the ascription of
responsibility as a social practice, then it has at least two
purposes: one purpose is to attempt to change people’s behavior
in the future and a second purpose is to establish, maintain and
repair the relationships of trust on which the moral community is
based. In both of these purposes, the practice of ascribing
responsibility relies upon a concept of autonomy.
The most obvious purpose of ascribing responsibility is to
shape people’s behavior in the future. The person held
responsible for a bad act will, we hope, reflect and decide
14
differently the next time. And, of course, the practice of
holding people responsible shapes the behavior of other actors
who are aware of it as well. One need not adopt a contra-causal
notion of freedom to make sense of this purpose, but one does
need a basic concept of autonomy. It may not matter whether
the agent could have done differently in the past, but she must
have some capacity for decision-making and self-direction in

12. Owen Flanagan, Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation, in IDENTITY,
CHARACTER, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 48 (Owen Flanagan &
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990).
13. PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 95 (2002).
14. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
COMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 182
(1992).
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response to the community’s norms in order for the ascription of
15
responsibility to affect her future behavior.
The second purpose of the social practice of ascribing
responsibility is to establish, maintain, and repair the
relationships of trust on which the moral community is based. In
order to live together, we must be able to trust each other, in
general, not to violate the shared norms of our community. The
practice of ascribing responsibility allows the victim of a
violation of that trust to register her hurt and outrage and to
assert the fundamental relationship of obligation between
16
herself, the agent of the violation, and the community. As with
self-trust, however, this is possible only if the agent in whom
trust is placed is seen as autonomous. Without a minimum
17
degree of self-direction, an agent can’t be trusted. Thus, both of
the central purposes of ascriptions of responsibility rest on a
18
concept of autonomy.
Finally, autonomy (understood as self-direction), is an
important part of how we understand the possibility of social
change and the meaning of politics. Obviously, if we are the
helpless products of our social conditioning, we cannot hope to
be the conscious agents of social change. Change may come, and
it may even come through us, but it will not be under our
direction unless we have some authorship of our own actions.
Political movement and democratic politics, in particular, would
make little sense in a world without autonomy. Or, to put it in
the way that Ed has so persuasively argued the point, much of
the reason that democratic politics has value for us is that it
19
represents both an exercise of and respect for our autonomy.
This is the overlapping consensus that Jim sees between Ed’s
20
autonomy theory and democracy theories.

15. See id. at 235–37.
16. See MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL UNDERSTANDINGS: A FEMINIST
STUDY IN ETHICS 95 (1998).
17. Of course, autonomy, while necessary, is not sufficient for trust. We might not
trust an autonomous person whom we believed to be malicious, for example.
18. The relationship between responsibility and autonomy is dialectical: the support
and dependence runs in both directions. For a discussion of the ways in which our
practices of ascribing responsibility support a concept of autonomy, see WILLIAMS, supra
note 1, at 141–42.
19. See Baker, supra note 3, at 265.
20. See James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed
Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 366 (2011).
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II. A NARRATIVE MODEL OF AUTONOMY
I suggest that a model of autonomy in which the central
activity is interpretive rather than volitional can serve these
important purposes while providing some crucial advantages
over a choice based model like Ed’s. Seana’s “thinker” is not as
focused on choice as the central activity; indeed, her approach
includes significant cognitive, perceptual, and emotional aspects
that suggest that she is combining autonomy with elements that I
have argued could be understood through a reconceptualized
21
truth theory of speech. Because I believe that blending
elements of epistemology and moral/political theory is necessary
to capture many of our deepest concerns, I am very sympathetic
to the move, implicit in Seana’s model, to bring both types of
22
elements together in a metaphor like the thinker. As a result,
the contrast to choice based theories in my description below is
intended to apply more to Ed’s approach than to Seana’s. In the
next section, where I will explain the primary advantages of a
narrative model, I will highlight the ones that are relevant to
Seana as well as to Ed.
I intend to use the category of narrative in a very broad and
inclusive way. In particular, I do not intend to limit narrative to
stories as conventionally understood. Instead, I am using
narrative to point to a broader category of activities in which a
person “orders a sequence of events [or, I would add, people or
things or concepts] for the purpose of revealing or creating
23
meaning.” A narrative model of autonomy identifies the central
focus of autonomy not as an act of choice, but as an act of
interpretation: the primary experience and exercise of autonomy
takes place when we make meaning. While “telling our own
stories” is a useful heuristic device to capture this idea, we
should not let the metaphor mislead us: many types of speech
make meaning in this way without taking the form of a
traditional story with plot or characters. The point is to focus not
21. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 95–129, 175–98.
22. See id. at 116–17. Indeed, Seana’s wonderful paper is causing me to reconsider
whether there is a single model or metaphor that can capture both of the sets of concerns
that I discuss in the book under truth and autonomy headings. Such unity would be
desirable for all the reasons she outlines and I think it might be possible that the thinker
could serve such a function, but, in order to address the concerns raised in this paper, the
model would need to be recast in more process-based and system-focused directions.
23. Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Resistance and Insubordination, 10 HYPATIA 23, 27
(1995). Because I am using narrative so broadly, my view of storytelling may come very
close to Seana’s view of thinking, which also involves a very broad range of cognitive and
emotional faculties.
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on these formal elements of storytelling, but on the central
project of interpretation and meaning making, rather than on
choice. The goal of autonomy in this model is that one’s identity
and life are not “the object or medium of someone else’s speech,
24
[but rather] the subject of one’s own.”
One obvious question raised by this narrative model of
autonomy is whether it has any role for action. In other words, if
I can tell my own story but am subject to restraints that prevent
me from acting on it, am I still autonomous? In answer to this
question, I think it is useful to distinguish between freedom and
autonomy. Freedom requires not only that I be autonomous in
the sense described here, but also that I experience negative
liberty (some degree of freedom from constraints on my action)
and also often positive liberty (some degree of support for the
resources, capacities, and opportunities necessary for my action).
Issues related to action (other than interpretive, meaningmaking actions) are best understood as raising these concerns of
negative and positive liberty, which are, of course, the subject of
many other legal protections, constitutional and statutory.
Autonomy is one necessary, but not sufficient, element of
freedom. One might, then, be autonomous but in many ways
unfree, because of such limitations on negative or positive
25
liberty. This approach facilitates the important work of
recognizing the autonomy that can be and often is exercised by
people under conditions of oppression. Even when their
freedom of action is drastically and unjustly curtailed, people can
and do exercise the autonomy to tell their own stories and make
26
their own meanings.
This process of narrative autonomy is fundamentally
relational. First, the model is substantively relational: the
content or substance of the categories we use in telling our
stories—the understandings of character, the familiar plot lines,
the narrative techniques—are part of our cultural inheritance
and are given to us through our social relations rather than
created ex nihilo by us individually. Second, the model is
causally relational: the capacities we use in the process of telling
our stories are the product of certain social relationships and
require such relations to sustain them. So, as many writers have
recognized, both rationality and imagination are capacities that
24. Susan J. Brison, The Uses of Narrative in the Aftermath of Violence, in ON
FEMINIST ETHICS AND POLITICS 214 (Claudia Card ed., 1999).
25. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 145–46.
26. See id. at 80.
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are learned, developed and sustained by social relationships.
Indeed, as Seana points out, isolating a person can lead to the
loss of a whole range of such capacities, sometimes to the point
28
of insanity. Finally, a narrative model of autonomy is inherently
relational: narrative (unlike choice) assumes a relational context.
It is not that one cannot tell a story alone, but (1) the normal
assumption is that stories are told to someone; (2) the exceptions
to this norm often confirm it by positing an imaginary audience;
and (3) even when the only audience is ourselves, we tend to
replicate the social aspect by thinking of ourselves as separated
into the part telling the story and the part hearing it. In other
words, a narrative model builds a relational element into the
concept of autonomy.
This narrative model can serve all of the purposes of
autonomy identified above. Moreover, it offers some interesting
and potentially helpful insights into the nature of the various
moral and political practices in which autonomy plays a part. For
example, the basic self-trust and self-respect that we need to
take an internal view of our own action can be grounded on the
self-direction that we experience through the process of creative
reinterpretation of our stories. Because symbolic systems always
include the possibility for reinterpretation and transformation,
our retellings are never fated to be simply parroting back what
we were given: they always include the possibility of creativity,
that is, of a conscious reworking of culturally given materials in
light of our normative commitments. Because we have access to
this form of agency (regardless of the truth or falsity of causal
determinism on some other level), we are never simply the
passive recipients of forces beyond our control. As a result, selftrust and self-respect are both possible and desirable.
Nonetheless, the relational elements of the model remind us
that our autonomy is always partial: we can be the authors of our
own stories, but we are never the only authors. In addition, our
capacity for self-direction is itself a product of social relations
and conditions often beyond our individual control. Thus, our
autonomy is also always contingent. As a result, our self-trust
and self-respect are consistent with both humility and
interdependence—indeed, require them. We need others to help

27. See ANNETTE BAIER, POSTURES OF THE MIND: ESSAYS ON MIND AND
MORALS 83–90 (1985) (describing us as “second persons” because we are created
through these relations.)
28. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 305.
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create and sustain in us the capacity for self-direction on which
our self-trust and self-respect depend.
Character also is supported by a narrative model of
autonomy: the process through which we claim our own
characters, and discern those of other people, is fundamentally
narrative. Again, however, a narrative model highlights the
relational nature of our characters and, as a result, their fluidity
and vulnerability to social conditions. We construct and
reconstruct our own characters and that of others through a
dialogue with other people. But the conditions of this dialogue
are not the same for everyone and systems of social hierarchy
and oppression are therefore relevant to our capacity for
narrative autonomy: “we are not all in the same discursive
positions any more than we are all in the same social ones. . . .
There are moral problems with the social distribution of
29
narrative resources and the credibility to use them.”
A narrative model of autonomy also serves the function of
supporting our system of ascribing responsibility. The two
primary purposes of this system, I suggested above, are to affect
people’s future behavior and to establish and maintain
relationships of trust on which communities depend. The
narrative model suggests that when a message of praise or blame
is communicated to someone, two things happen: first, the agent
is presented with certain information which she must assess in
terms of, and perhaps incorporate into, her stories about herself
and, second, the agent must respond to the effect of the
ascription of responsibility on her relationships with her dialogic
partners within the moral community. Again, the crucial
question raised by this understanding of autonomy is: what are
the conditions that help or hinder the agent in her efforts to
exercise her powers of creative interpretation in carrying out
these tasks?
Finally, a narrative model of autonomy also provides a
meaningful basis for our practices of democratic politics. As is
probably apparent, a narrative model of autonomy provides
support for a dialogic model of democracy. Because our
autonomous identities are created through a process of dialogue
with others, it is a mistake to see our interests and values as
endogenous to politics. Moreover, political interaction is one of
the important realms in which we engage in building narrative

29. WALKER, supra note 16, at 106–07.
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30

autonomy. The goal of politics is not to preserve a pre-existing
sphere of individual autonomy, but to provide the types of
31
interaction that constitute one part of our autonomy.
Given that the model of autonomy proposed here is
narrative, it is probably not necessary to go into great detail
about how it is related to speech. So, I will just point out that
there are two primary ways in which speech is related to
narrative autonomy. First, many speech acts would themselves be
exercises of narrative autonomy: telling one’s story in the broadest
sense. Second, the systems of speech (such as the structure of
broadcasting markets or the financing of political campaigns)
affect the possibility of autonomy for many people. Such systems
can have two different types of effects: (1) increasing or
decreasing the opportunities for the exercise of narrative
autonomy, and (2) facilitating or hindering the development of
the capacities needed for narrative autonomy. Speech is
uniquely significant to the exercise of narrative autonomy (at
both the individual and collective levels) because it is through
the manipulation of symbolic systems that we create meaning,
engage in interpretation, and communicate, which are the basic
components of narrative. On the other hand, speech is not
uniquely significant to the development of the capacities for
autonomy. I will pursue this distinction a little further in the next
section, when I explore a few of the implications of a narrative
approach for specific speech issues.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A NARRATIVE MODEL
I believe that this narrative model has two primary
advantages over more traditional autonomy theories. First, the
narrative model sees autonomy as an on-going process rather
than as a pre-existing capacity, and that shifts the analysis in
ways that are useful for avoiding some of the pitfalls of
traditional autonomy theories. Second, the narrative model
focuses our attention on the social conditions that facilitate or
frustrate the development and exercise of autonomy. It forces us
to consider whether our systems of speech are helping or
hindering that autonomy and not only whether they are
30. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000)
(developing a theory of communicative democracy).
31. This need not be the only goal of politics, of course: politics might also serve
utilitarian purposes of promoting the general welfare or, as Vincent Blasi has suggested,
building certain character traits in citizens. But this understanding of democratic politics
does have implications for these other purposes. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 170.
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frustrating its expression in a particular case. As a result, it
makes considerations of inequality central to the concerns of the
first amendment.
The first advantage of a narrative model is that, in this
model, autonomy is neither a preexisting condition that can be
assumed for all persons (as I believe it is for both Ed and
32
Seana) nor is it an end state that can be taken for granted once
33
achieved. It is, instead, a process that must be continually
ongoing for a person to be autonomous. Autonomy can,
therefore, exist to different degrees and in different areas of
34
one’s life.
There are several useful results of this shift to
understanding autonomy as a process. First, when autonomy is
seen not as an achievement or a precondition, but as an ongoing
and always imperfect process, then we have a much better way
of approaching the difficult issues raised by persons whose
35
capacities are less developed. Children or adults with mental
disabilities, who may have reduced capacity for rational
reflection compared to average adults, have, for that reason,
often been seen as less autonomous and, therefore, less
deserving of the rights due to autonomous persons. Women have
32. See Baker, supra note 3, at 254 (formal conception of autonomy “consists of a
person’s authority (or right) to make decisions about herself”). Given Ed’s conviction
that the basis for governmental legitimacy rests on respect for autonomy, it must be the
case that autonomy has to be assumed by the government as (at least) a starting point for
all normal, adult persons. For Seana, the issue is somewhat less clear. Her paper suggests
a similarly ascriptive role for autonomy. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 287 (“I will proceed
from the assumption that, for the most part, we are individual human agents with
significant . . . capacities . . . I will also assume that our possession and exercise of these
capacities correctly constitute the core of what we value about ourselves.”). Nonetheless,
I think that Seana’s focus on capacities opens the window for her to move in the direction
I am outlining here: seeing autonomy as a process rather than an assumed starting point
and paying attention to the social conditions necessary to develop and maintain those
capacities. I just don’t know whether she is interested in jumping out that particular
window or not.
33. As it appears to be for some other, liberal autonomy theorists. See, e.g.,
ALFRED R. MELE, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS: FROM SELF-CONTROL TO AUTONOMY 228–
29 (1995) (describing the process of becoming autonomous in terms of the development
of certain cognitive and motor skills).
34. Choice does not disappear from our experience in this model. Moments of
choice are often the catalyst for telling or retelling our stories and choices are among the
more important consequences of telling a particular story in a particular way. But choice
is unique neither as the occasion for narrative autonomy (e.g. think about unchosen
changes like the death of a loved one that cause a retelling of our stories) nor as the
consequence of narrative autonomy (both forms of knowledge and relationships—not
always experienced as chosen—are other common consequences of retelling our stories).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 149–50.
35. I am grateful to Jill Hasday for raising this issue in her helpful comments on this
paper.
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36

sometimes been categorized the same way. But from the
perspective of a narrative model of autonomy, all persons’
autonomy is partial, episodic, and imperfect. The issue is not to
find some baseline of autonomy to mark out the persons who are
autonomous enough to deserve rights. A narrative model does
not divide people into categories of autonomous and nonautonomous on this basis or for this purpose. Instead, a narrative
model suggests that the central issue is to think about the
barriers and limitations that restrict autonomy for various
persons and to work to provide people with the opportunities
and resources necessary to increase their autonomy. In other
words, the question in any given case is not whether such
persons are currently autonomous enough to demand rights, but
how to structure their rights so as to facilitate their autonomy.
Children or people with developmental limitations may need
rights that function differently to facilitate their autonomy than
average adults. But no one is categorically excluded and the
question for all persons is essentially the same.
Another important consequence of thinking of autonomy as
a process rather than as a starting point is that it shifts our focus
from the theoretical questions about free will and determinism
37
that have plagued traditional theories of autonomy, to the
practical questions about the conditions necessary to support our
experience of this process. Rather than struggling to explain
exactly what sort of freedom from causal determinism is
necessary to make autonomy work and how exactly that type or
degree of freedom is possible, we can focus on the experience of
being able or unable to tell our stories and the conditions that
frustrate or facilitate this process.
This problem with seeing autonomy as a starting point is
part of the reason that both Ed and Seana are led to what I
believe to be an ultimately dissatisfying explanation for the
limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech.
Thinking of autonomy as a starting point to be generally
assumed leads them to try to explain limited protection for
commercial speech by pointing to conditions of coercion that

36. See Diana T. Meyers, The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy, in
WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 145 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
37. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 27 (John Christman
ed., 1989); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988);
ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
(1986).
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take it out of the category of autonomous speech. If autonomy
is assumed as the normal starting point, then some argument like
this appears to be necessary to explain why a particular category
of speech is not deserving of protection. The problem, which
both Ed and Seana have recognized and struggled with here, is
that many forms of speech are subject to a vast range of types
39
and amounts of coercion. We all operate under such pressures
constantly, and they interact in ways that are complex and highly
individual in determining the range of choices open to us. There
is no reason to believe that the pressures of the market on
commercial speech are different either in kind or degree from
the pressures experienced by other speakers in a host of
situations in which we all agree their speech should be protected
(e.g., religious organizations in which members are pressured to
speak on behalf of the group’s beliefs). Some people obviously
do engage in commercial speech that reflects their values, and
other people engage in non-commercial forms of speech that are
more a response to social pressures than a reflection of their own
values. Thinking of autonomy as a precondition for speech
protection puts us in the untenable position of trying to draw a
line to mark the area of speech that is autonomous enough to
qualify for First Amendment protection.
Thinking of autonomy not as a given but as a process—and,
in particular, as a process that is both dependent upon and
actualized within social relationships—leads to a different focus.
From the perspective of narrative autonomy, it is not the
breadth or narrowness of choice left open by social pressures
(market-driven or otherwise) that determines whether speech is
protected. The central question is, instead, whether the speech
systems surrounding commercial speech allow and encourage
people to develop and exercise the range of capacities involved
in telling their own stories. In other words, the issue is not
whether commercial speech is sufficiently autonomous to be
deserving of First Amendment respect; the issue is whether the
commercial speech system is sufficiently protective of narrative
autonomy.
This question would lead us to a set of different
considerations with respect to commercial speech. In thinking
about the speaker, we might ask whether the social safety net in
38. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J.
981, 985–94 (2009); Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 296.
39. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 296–97 (recognizing the limits of these
arguments but reiterating the basic point).
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our society is sufficient to allow people some meaningful
opportunity to express their creativity at the risk of losing their
jobs. We might ask about the ways of encouraging corporate
cultures that nurture creativity. And we might ask about the
structure of a market that could incorporate the pursuit of values
in addition to profit. In terms of the listeners, we might ask
about the impact of advertising on our capacities for reflection
and our sense of self-worth. We might think about the potential
for creative resistance to such effects and the ways in which
speech systems might facilitate such resistance. I am not
suggesting that any one (or even all) of these concerns would
lead us to the conclusion that commercial speech is unprotected.
Rather, they might lead us to the conclusion that certain kinds of
government efforts to improve this speech system by altering
underlying conditions, even at some cost to current speech, do
not violate the First Amendment.
The point is to focus not on whether a particular example of
speech represents a sufficient exercise of autonomy to qualify for
protection, but instead on whether the existing speech systems
facilitate and encourage autonomy. That, after all, is the real
problem. Denying First Amendment protection to commercial
speech does not begin to address these underlying systemic
issues, it simply makes them easier to ignore by blunting some of
the social costs they impose. A model that focuses on autonomy
as a process rather than a pre-existing state directs our attention
to these more significant systemic concerns that shape our
capacities for autonomy.
This point leads me to the second advantage of a narrative
model: the general focus on systems. It is because a narrative
model makes social relations so central to autonomy—causally
and conceptually—that it leads to this focus on the background
and systemic conditions that are so often overlooked by other
40
autonomy theories. In thinking about the protection for speech
40. Both Ed and Seana include important relational elements that distinguish their
approaches to autonomy from much of the traditional literature. For example, Ed
focuses not only on self-expression but also on participation in social change as a central
element of autonomy, see C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom
of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 991 (1978), and Seana emphasizes the ways in which
relationships with others are crucial to the faculties she identifies as fundamental to
autonomy. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 284–85. But neither of them focuses attention on
the relationships in which the capacities for autonomy are created and maintained as a
concern of first amendment analysis. Again, the point is not to make such conditions
themselves violations of the first amendment but rather to suggest that government
action directed to addressing such conditions should be seen as contributing to the
purposes of the first amendment even if it causes some interference with speech that is
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as serving the goal of protecting autonomy, we must pay
attention to the systems of social relations that facilitate the
development and maintenance of the capacities necessary for
autonomy.
I need to pause here to make clear that this systemic
approach is not equivalent to a focus on what Ed calls
“substantive equality” in his contribution to this exchange. He
defines substantive autonomy as a person’s “capacity to pursue
41
successfully the life she endorses.” This he contrasts with the
formal autonomy he is endorsing, which “consists of a person’s
authority (or right) to make decisions about herself—her own
meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources—as long
42
as her actions do not block others’ similar authority or rights.”
As I understand it, this distinction points to the difference
between choice, which is the heart of formal autonomy, and
action, which is the focus of substantive autonomy. So, when a
critic of formal equality complains that there is not much point
in a model of autonomy that protects a person’s right to choose
to be a lawyer if she has no realistic possibility of getting the
training or opportunity to actually be one, that critic is relying on
a substantive conception of autonomy.
A narrative model of autonomy is, however, not a
substantive one in Ed’s sense. A narrative model focuses on the
ability to tell one’s own story, but it does not address the ability
to make that story a practical reality through action in the world.
The latter ability is also crucial, but is best understood as liberty
(both positive and negative) and is, as Ed points out with respect
43
to substantive autonomy, inherently and inescapably partial.
The more important of such liberties are the subject of other
constitutional protections and, like Seana, I think it is a strength
of autonomy theories that they are able to offer a coherent
account of how freedom of speech is related to, and
44
interdependent with, other fundamental rights, such as privacy.
Although narrative autonomy is not substantive in Ed’s
sense, there is a similarity between narrative autonomy and

generated by the current, problematic systems of expression.
41. Baker, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 253.
42. Id. at 254.
43. See id; see also text accompanying notes 24–26 (arguing that freedom is best
understood as the combination of autonomy, negative liberty, and positive liberty.)
44. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 288; WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 204–05 (arguing
that the first amendment should, therefore, be understood to have implications for our
interpretation of other constitutional provisions).
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substantive autonomy: both focus on the conditions in the world
that are necessary to support the exercise of autonomy. In the
case of narrative autonomy, there are two sets of such
conditions: those social relations that provide the foundation for
the various capacities needed to tell one’s own story and those
that allow the practice of such telling to flourish. The systems
that help develop (or retard the development of) our capacities
are, of course, much wider than speech systems. Certainly, an
economic system that generates vast disparities in wealth is at
least as important in affecting the potential for many people to
develop capacities for autonomy as any system of speech. The
First Amendment cannot directly address such non-speech
systems, but the values underlying freedom of speech may have
implications for the interpretation of other parts of the
45
Constitution. Nonetheless, while other systems have a large
impact, speech systems are the primary mode through which
narrative autonomy is practiced and one of the primary modes
through which the capacities necessary for narrative autonomy
are developed and sustained. The educational system, the mass
media, the internet, political campaigns, the system of
government funding for speech, the rules governing the use of
government property for speech purposes—these are all
examples of speech systems. The protection for freedom of
speech should be understood as protection for the health and
good functioning of such systems rather than only as protection
for individual rights.
This shift in focus allows us to seriously consider some of
the kinds of problems current speech doctrine has difficulty even
recognizing: the ways in which systems of speech restrict the
opportunities for narrative autonomy for groups of people even
if they do not violate the rights of any particular individual. I
have offered elsewhere an extended argument for the conclusion
that attention to the systemic issues in political campaign finance
regulation demonstrates that such regulations should be allowed
when they have the purpose and effect of increasing the ability
of the system to promote narrative autonomy, even if they
involve some cost to speech produced under the current
46
problematic system.

45. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 222 (arguing that protection of narrative
autonomy might lead us to conclude that property-tax based school systems violate the
equal protection clause).
46. Id. at 210–21.
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Similarly, a concern for the health of speech systems would
lead to a rule that government action that has as its purpose the
restriction of narrative autonomy should be suspect whether or
not any particular person’s opportunity to speak has been
47
limited by that action. This approach would suggest, for
example that, regardless of whether a government funding
program for speech involves a “penalty” or merely a “refusal to
subsidize,” the program is unconstitutional if its purpose is to
restrict the ability of persons to engage in narrative autonomy.
48
Thus, the crucial issue in Rust v. Sullivan, in which the
government prohibited family planning programs receiving
federal funds from providing counseling regarding abortion, is
actually about the autonomy of the women rather than about the
autonomy of the family planning clinics whose speech was
directly affected. The problem here is primarily a problem about
the government’s purpose in regulating this speech system,
rather than about the impact on the speaker. The government’s
purpose in this case was not just to refuse government funding
for abortions (which is not a First Amendment violation, whatever its status under the Fourteenth Amendment), but to limit
the information women received in such programs in ways that
would make it more difficult for them to decide to have
abortions, regardless of the source of funding for the procedure.
In other words, the government’s purpose was precisely to
restrict the autonomy of the women and, as such, it should have
been unconstitutional regardless of whether the program
49
involved a penalty or a refusal to subsidize. This understanding
of Rust is consistent, I believe, with the deep sense of moral
outrage that the case inspires, which is based not on the impact
on the doctors who were silenced, but on the impact on the
women whose autonomy was deliberately reduced by the
government action.

47. This insight represents the kernel of truth at the heart of the anti-paternalism
argument the Court often relies upon. See, e.g., 44 Liqourmart, Inc.v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (striking down a law prohibiting alcohol price advertisements).
48. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
49. The focus in current doctrine on whether the government has created a public
forum might persist, since the obligations on the government in a public forum go well
beyond the minimal restriction discussed here. But even in the absence of a public forum,
this limitation on purpose should apply.
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CONCLUSION
In short, I agree with Ed and Seana that autonomy is a
central value protected by freedom of speech and that it
provides an important basis for the First Amendment. And, like
them, I believe that we need a clear statement of the nature of
autonomy and the reasons why it is so important in order to
understand the nature of the legal protections that are necessary
to sustain it. But I also believe that the conception of autonomy
we should be using is one that makes human relations and social
systems central to our analysis. Adopting this approach to
autonomy allows us to see autonomy as a process rather than an
assumed starting point and thereby avoids the problematic issues
raised by refusing protection to speech that is deeply shaped by
social (including market) influences. In addition, this approach
refocuses our attention on the issues of inequality that prevent
our speech systems from providing meaningful opportunities for
autonomy to significant groups of people. Issues of inequality
have been important to some democracy theories, but they have
traditionally been less significant for autonomy theory because
of its focus on choice, its failure to recognize the relationality of
autonomy, and its assumption that autonomy is a starting point
to be assumed for all. Bringing a concern for inequality into the
center of autonomy theory is, I believe, one of the more
important tasks of free speech theory.

